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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Alesha Ann Green appealed from the Judgment dismissing her Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, asserting the district court erred when it addressed 
the potential conflict of interest in her case because it did not adequately inquire into 
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  
Ms. Green’s trial counsel in the underlying criminal case and her post-conviction 
counsel worked for the same public defender’s office, and Ms. Green’s post-conviction 
petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.  The district 
court recognized there was a potential conflict of interest, but it did not adequately 
inquire into whether the circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant 
likelihood of prejudice. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Ms. Green “has not shown that the 
district court failed to make an adequate inquiry into whether [Ms.] Green’s post-
conviction counsel had a conflict of interest[].”  (Resp. Br., p.7.)  This Reply Brief is 
necessary to show the district court did not adequately inquire into whether the 
circumstances of Ms. Green’s case demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Green’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in 
Ms. Green’s case, because it did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances 
demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Addressed The Potential Conflict Of Interest In 
Ms. Green’s Case, Because It Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The 
Circumstances Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice   
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict 
of interest in her case because it did not adequately inquire into whether the 
circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  The district court 
recognized there was a potential conflict of interest because Ms. Green’s trial counsel 
and post-conviction counsel both worked for the same office and Ms. Green’s petition 
raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims against trial counsel.  However, the 
district court did not adequately inquire into whether the circumstances demonstrated a 
significant likelihood of prejudice, because it did not ask post-conviction counsel 
questions such as whether his office had set up effective measures to prevent 
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of 
individual defendants. 
 
B. The District Court Did Not Adequately Inquire Into Whether The Circumstances 
Of Ms. Green’s Case Demonstrated A Significant Likelihood Of Prejudice 
 
Ms. Green asserts the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict 
of interest in her case.  The State argues the district court’s sua sponte inquiry was 
more than adequate to protect Ms. Green’s nonexistent right to conflict-free counsel on 
post-conviction.  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  However, the district court did not conduct an 
adequate inquiry. 
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As a preliminary matter, the State appears to have misunderstood Ms. Green’s 
assertions on appeal.  Ms. Green has not argued “that appointing the public defender’s 
office in post-conviction proceedings automatically triggers some duty to inquire about 
potential conflicts in every case where a separate public defender served as trial 
counsel.”  (See Resp. Br., p.7.)  The potential conflict of interest arises here from the 
facts that Ms. Green’s post-conviction petition raised ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims against trial counsel, and post-conviction counsel worked for the same office as 
trial counsel.  (See R., pp.5-6, 23, 49.)  Because of that potential conflict of interest in 
this particular case, the district court should have conducted an adequate inquiry into 
whether the circumstances demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice. 
The State also argues Ms. Green has contended “she has some amorphous due 
process right that requires the court to inquire into conflicts.”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  While 
Ms. Green has noted the Idaho Court of Appeals has held a post-conviction petitioner 
has an interest in securing assistance to adequately present his claims for purposes of 
procedural due process (App. Br., p.8 (quoting Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342 
(Ct. App. 2007)), she asserts on appeal a district court should inquire into potential 
conflicts of interest in post-conviction matters “by analogy to the constitutional standard, 
and to preserve the petitioner’s opportunity to work with post-conviction counsel.”  (App. 
Br., p.9.)   
Under the statutory standard for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, if a 
petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should 
appoint counsel to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and “properly 
allege the necessary supporting facts.”  See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 
 5 
(2004).  The statutory opportunity to work with counsel would be hollow if post-
conviction counsel with a conflict were allowed to stay on a petitioner’s case.  Cf. 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012).  
To present a claim of ineffective assistance at trial in accordance with the 
State’s procedures . . . a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney. . . .  A 
prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern 
when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is a bedrock principle in our justice system. 
 
The State is correct that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), because this is a case involving 
representation of the same client by two attorneys at the same office, rather than 
representation of different clients.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)  However, it does not follow 
that an inquiry into whether the office in this case set up effective measures to prevent 
communication of confidential client information between lawyers employed on behalf of 
individual defendants is, as the State suggests (see Resp. Br., pp.6-7), irrelevant.  
Because trial counsel and post-conviction counsel both represented Ms. Green as 
employees of the same office, and Ms. Green raised ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims against trial counsel, this case presents a classic conflict.  See Adams v. State, 
380 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam) (“The public defender . . . would be faced 
with the dilemma of vigorously asserting the petitioner’s claim or defending the 
professional reputation of his office.  This would be at least as great a conflict as having 
the same office represent two defendants with conflicting interests . . . .”)   
Further, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct do not indicate that the 
principles governing conflicts of interest in concurrent representation are inapplicable to 
potential conflicts of interest like the one at issue here.  See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 
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& 1.10.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more client will be materially limited . . . by the personal 
interests of the lawyer . . . .”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2).  A public defender’s 
concurrent conflict of interest may be imputed to his or her entire office on a case-by-
case basis.  See Severson, 147 Idaho at 706; cf. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.10(a) 
(containing the general rule, not applicable here, that a lawyer’s concurrent conflicts of 
interest are necessarily imputed to his or her entire firm).  
Contrary to the State’s argument, the principles governing conflicts of interest in 
concurrent representation apply to potential conflicts of interest like the one at issue 
here.  For example, Ms. Green would submit that comment 10 to Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.7, with its statement that “if the probity of a lawyer’s own 
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the 
lawyer to give a client detached advice,” would apply to instances where two attorneys 
from the same office represented the same client and the first attorney’s conflict was 
imputed to the entire office.  See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 10 & 1.10(a)(1); see 
also Keats v. State, 115 P.3d 1110 (Wyo. 2005) (“There is . . . some indication that it is 
not appropriate or expected for one to raise one’s own ineffectiveness.  We too have 
identified that such a practice is questionable.” (citations omitted)).   
Such considerations would likewise apply where a public defender’s conflict was 
imputed to his or her entire office on a case-by-case basis.  See Severson, 147 Idaho at 
706; see also Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (“If a criminal 
defendant is represented by trial and appellate counsel from the same office, appellate 
counsel’s assessment of trial counsel’s performance may be less than completely 
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objective.  An understandable, although inappropriate, regard for collegiality may 
restrain appellate counsel from identifying and arguing trial attorney-error.”).  Thus, 
faced with a potential conflict of interest such as the one in this case, a district court 
should conduct an adequate inquiry into whether the circumstances demonstrated a 
significant likelihood of prejudice. 
The State further contends the district court’s superficial inquiry here was 
adequate because the district court “discover[ed] that there was in fact no conflict of 
interest.”  (See Resp. Br., pp.5-6.)  But the district court’s inquiry failed to show there 
was no conflict of interest.   
The district courts questioned whether the case was not sent out for conflict 
counsel because post-conviction counsel had not been the trial attorney, and post-
conviction counsels answered, “That’s what my boss tells me, Your Honor,” (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.9-14), did not resolve whether there was a conflict.  That part of the inquiry did not 
demonstrate post-conviction counsel had been effectively “firewalled” or prevented from 
communicating with trial counsel regarding confidential client information.  See 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 707.  Nor did it dispel any possible concerns about post-
conviction counsel harboring an interest in not having another attorney from his office 
be found ineffective.  See Cannon, 383 F.3d at 1173 (“Arguing ineffective assistance 
with respect to a colleague’s performance is saying that the performance was not only 
inferior, but unreasonable. . . .  Presenting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
may well damage the reputation of the trial attorney and the office for which both trial 
and appellate counsel work.”). 
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 Post-conviction counsel’s affirmative response to the district court’s question on 
whether he had discussed with Ms. Green that he was representing her as a member of 
the Ada County Public Defender’s Office (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-22), also did not resolve 
whether there was a conflict.  The answer to that question did not indicate that 
Ms. Green had waived the potential conflict of interest by giving her “informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.”  See Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4) & 1.10(c).  The district 
court’s superficial inquiry did not lead it to discover there was no conflict of interest. 
Despite the State’s arguments, the district court did not adequately inquire into 
whether the circumstances here demonstrated a significant likelihood of prejudice.  
Thus, the district court erred when it addressed the potential conflict of interest in 
Ms. Green’s case.  The judgment dismissing Ms. Green’s amended post-conviction 
petition should be vacated and the matter should be remanded to the district court for a 
proper conflict determination.  If the district court determines there is a conflict of 
interest imputed to post-conviction counsel, Ms. Green should receive conflict-free 
counsel to preserve her opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the 
necessary supporting facts for her post-conviction claims.  See Charboneau, 140 Idaho 
at 793.   
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Ms. Green respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment dismissing her 
amended post-conviction petition and remand her case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 24th day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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